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The epistemology of essence is a topic that has received relatively little attention, although 
there are signs that this is changing. The lack of literature engaging directly with the topic is 
probably partly due to the mystery surrounding the notion of essence itself, and partly due to 
the sheer difficulty of developing a plausible epistemology. The need for such an account is 
clear especially for those, like E.J. Lowe, who are committed to a broadly Aristotelian 
conception of essence, whereby essence plays an important theoretical role. In this chapter, 
our epistemic access to essence is examined in terms of the a posteriori vs. a priori 









1. Defining the notion of essence 
The notion of essence is notoriously mysterious: philosophers seem to use it in a number of 
different senses, and even if they do use the notion in the same sense, it is often not quite clear 
what that sense is. At the same time, essences, when they are invoked, are generally supposed 
to do a lot of explanatory work: natural kinds can be identified in terms of their essences, 
metaphysical modality may be reduced to essence,1 the causal powers of various entities can 
be explained with the help of essences, and so on. In what follows, I will first attempt to offer 
a working definition of the notion and will then lay out the available options regarding the 
epistemology of essence. Following these introductory remarks, I will proceed to analyse the 
options. 
 As E.J. Lowe often puts it, perhaps the closest thing to a definition of essence that we 
may have is the familiar phrase from Locke: ‘the very being of any thing, whereby it is what it 
is’ (1975: III, III, §15). But this phrase is not particularly informative. What exactly is ‘the 
very being’ of a thing, and how is it that we come to know ‘the very being’ of things? Locke 
himself considered real essences (as opposed to merely nominal essences) to be unknowable 
to us, but in contemporary metaphysics, a modal interpretation of essence due to the work of 
Kripke and Putnam has been the standard.2 In the tradition of ‘Kripke-Putnam essentialism’, 
essences are explained in terms of de re modality: an attribution of necessity to a proposition 
is de dicto, but when we attribute necessity to an object we are dealing with de re necessity, 
and hence essence.3 Another feature of the Kripke-Putnam tradition is that it is commonly 
                                                 
1 Following Kit Fine (1994), more on this below. 
2 See Lowe (2011a) for an illuminating discussion of Locke’s views on essence, and for a comparison of Locke’s 
account with the Kripke-Putnam line. 
3 I should note that by ‘Kripke-Putnam essentialism’ I refer mainly to the work of those philosophers who are 
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thought that science discovers essences; that is, essences are discovered (at least for the most 
part) a posteriori, empirically. The apparent problem with this approach is that ‘little, if 
anything, is known about how or why objects have their de re modal properties’, as L.A. Paul 
(2006: 335) puts it. Accordingly, the epistemic problem has been merely postponed. This is 
certainly a pressing problem at least for those who consider the possession of de re modal 
properties to be primitive.4 
 Before we proceed any further, it should be made clear that the understanding of 
essence to be adopted in this paper is not the one familiar from the Kripke-Putnam tradition, 
which represents what we might call the ‘modalist’ view of essence: an object has a property 
essentially if and only if it has that property necessarily. The alternative, broadly Aristotelian 
approach has been made popular by Kit Fine (1994, 1995a, 1995b) and E.J. Lowe (e.g., 2006, 
2007, 2008a, 2011a). Other contemporary proponents of a broadly Aristotelian conception of 
essence include, for instance, David S. Oderberg (2007, 2011) and Kathrin Koslicki (e.g., 
2012).5 This broadly Aristotelian view of essence – which I do not claim to be entirely faithful 
to Aristotle – suggests that not all necessary truths about a given entity x are essential truths 
                                                                                                                                                        
broadly sympathetic to the idea that there are mind-independent (natural kind) essences and that they can be 
interpreted in terms of de re modal properties. My remarks should not be understood as exegetical; in fact, 
Putnam (1990) has distanced himself from this line of thought altogether, and it is not entirely clear what 
Kripke’s own position is. For further discussion of these issues, see Tahko (2015a). 
4 Paul (2004) develops an account of de re modal properties in terms of bundle theory, but if this means that 
essences are to be conceived as bundles of properties, then this view as well has its problems, as Oderberg 
(2007, 2011) has argued. These issues will be examined in detail in what follows. 
5 Scott Shalkowski’s work (e.g., 1997, 2004) in defence of and developing on a Finean conception of essence 
and modality should be mentioned in this connection as well, as should Fabrice Correia’s (e.g., 2011). There 
are, of course, many others who have developed relevant accounts, such as Crawford Elder (2004), but it will 
not be possible to discuss all of them here. My focus will be on Lowe, for obvious reasons. 
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about x, but all necessary truths are true in virtue of (or, one might say, grounded in) essential 
truths (about some entity or other). This implies that essential truths about x are a proper 
subset of the necessary truths about x, but even those necessary truths about x that are not 
essential truths about x are nevertheless essential truths about some entity or other. So, 
according to this view, essence is ontologically prior to modality in the sense that essential 
truths are more fundamental than modal truths. On this view we should not reduce essence to 
de re modal properties.6 
 Lowe sometimes refers to his own, broadly Aristotelian view of essence as ‘serious 
essentialism’ (e.g., Lowe 2013: 144). But as we saw, Lowe in fact takes his inspiration from 
Locke, suggesting simply that the essence of x is just the very identity of x. Moreover, it is 
important for Lowe that essences are not themselves further entities (in contrast to Locke). 
Since he takes it that all entities have an essence, there would seem to be a threat of infinite 
regress if essences themselves were entities. Indeed, why would we think that the identity of a 
thing would itself be an entity? More precisely, the conception of essence at hand suggests 
that once we know the identity and existence conditions of an entity, we know its essence; we 
may express this essence in terms of a set of these identity and existence conditions, or in 
terms of a proposition listing these conditions, but the essence itself is not a set or a 
proposition. I believe that this comes close to Lowe’s view of the matter, but things are 
somewhat less clear with other broadly Aristotelian versions of essentialism, such as Kit 
Fine’s, who sometimes writes as if essences themselves are propositions: ‘we may identify the 
being or essence of x with the collection of propositions that are true in virtue of its identity’ 
                                                 
6 As Shalkowski (2008: 51) puts it, ‘de dicto necessity is a species of de re necessity’, and hence the former is 
‘not free from essentialist implications.’ For more critical remarks regarding the traditional approach, see 
Lowe 2013: Ch. 8. 
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(Fine 1995c: 275). I will leave this issue aside, interesting as it is – in what follows it is 
assumed that essences are not themselves entities. 
 
 Finally, the distinction between general and individual essences should be mentioned; 
or in other words, the distinction between kind essences and particular essences. This is an 
important distinction for Lowe (2013: 145), although personally I am somewhat sceptical 
about individual essences, such as the essence of an individual cat. General essences such as 
the essence of the kind ‘cat’ will be my main focus – although there may be reasons to be 
sceptical about some general essences as well, such as those of biological species.7 Let that 
pass for now. General essences are nevertheless somewhat less controversial than individual 
essences. Indeed, in a classic paper, Baruch Brody (1973) considers it an advantage of 
‘Aristotelian essentialism’ that it connects essentiality with what it is to be a natural kind. It 
follows that essences of artificial objects, such as tables and chairs, are also among the more 
controversial cases – I will largely omit discussion of them. 
 
 Typically, we think of our epistemic access to essence (and also modality) in terms of 
the a priori vs. a posteriori distinction, although I should immediately note that I consider this 
distinction to be somewhat vague.8 It should also be noted that even though essence and 
modality are undoubtedly linked in an important way, the initial assumption of this article is, 
following Lowe, that essence is ontologically and epistemically prior to modality. In what 
follows I will examine the a priori and the a posteriori routes to essentialist knowledge, 
                                                 
7  Defenders of biological essentialism are few and far between, but see for instance Austin (forthcoming) for a 
recent account. 
8 See Tahko (2017) for discussion. See also Vaidya (2015) for a helpful classification of different approaches to 
modal epistemology. Vaidya also discusses, e.g., Bob Hale’s essentialist view, which I will not attempt to 
cover in this article. 
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before concluding with a brief discussion of a hybrid view, where each method is 
acknowledged. I am presently more interested in mapping our options regarding the 
epistemology of essence as well as clarifying Lowe’s view rather than defending a particular 
position. Another preliminary point worth noting is that in my analysis I will first explore the 
possibility of a unitary view of the epistemology of essence, even though I am doubtful that 
our epistemic access to essence is always via the same route (which leads to the hybrid view). 
However, for the sake of parsimony, a unitary account would be preferable, so I think that 
hybrid accounts should be considered only if all unitary accounts fail. 
 
2. Epistemic access to essence 
Given that essence is understood to be ontologically prior to modality, it may, at least initially, 
seem more promising to give an account of the epistemology of essence independently of the 
epistemology of modality. This would imply that the epistemology of modality is a special 
case of the epistemology of essence. Hence, if we could give a plausible account of the 
epistemology of essence, we would also have the beginnings of an account of the 
epistemology of modality. Although explicit defences of this idea are relatively rare, it seems 
that this is a popular route for contemporary essentialists.9 However, there is certainly less 
agreement about whether our knowledge of essence is a priori or a posteriori. I will consider 
                                                 
9 In discussion, both Kit Fine and E.J. Lowe have indicated to me that this option is more attractive to them. In 
Lowe’s case this is also clear from his written work. Note however that nothing here entails conceptual 
reductionism about modality, i.e., the concept of modality is not necessarily analyzable in terms of the 
concept of essence, even if the former does reduce to the latter on an ontological level, and even if essence is 
epistemically prior to modality. So, an understanding of the concept of modality may not be available simply 





2.1 A posteriori access to essence 
One of the supposed advantages of Kripke-Putnam essentialism is that our knowledge of 
essence, or essential properties, can be traced to scientific knowledge in a seemingly 
straightforward manner. Indeed, many contemporary essentialists continue to support this type 
of approach; it is familiar from the literature on ‘scientific’ or ‘dispositional’ essentialism 
(e.g., Ellis 2001, Bird 2007a). However, since the conception of essence taken for granted in 
much of this literature is that essence reduces to modality (rather than the other way around), 
it is not obvious that scientific essentialism is able to give us a sufficiently fine-grained 
account of the epistemology of essence understood in a broadly Aristotelian manner.10 A 
typical conviction of the scientific essentialist is that the laws of nature are metaphysically 
necessary, in which case our knowledge of the laws of nature is a direct route to substantial 
modal knowledge, with empirical science playing a key role. But while this conception may 
bear some resemblance to Aristotelian essentialism, it neglects a key feature of the 
Aristotelian ontology of essence, namely that essence is ontologically prior to modality. 
 Can we build on the work of scientific essentialists while adopting the Aristotelian 
ontology of essence? Oderberg’s essentialism is perhaps the most interesting attempt at this.11 
However, Oderberg (2007: 13) thinks, contrary to some versions of the Kripke-Putnam line 
and scientific essentialism, that discovering essences is not just the work of scientists. He 
would nevertheless insist that essentialism is a fallibilist position, that is, our knowledge of 
essence is subject to revision (ibid., 48). Crucial to this line of thought is that although 
                                                 
10 See Lowe (2006: ch. 9–10) for discussion and criticism of scientific essentialism. 
11 Regarding laws of nature in particular, see Oderberg’s contribution to this volume. 
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scientists play an important role in the discovery of essences, we cannot simply rely on 
experts to explain the epistemology of essence. Oderberg (ibid., 13) argues, like Lowe, that 
everyone can have knowledge of essences. It is first and foremost the metaphysician’s task to 
explain essence, but scientific knowledge is indispensable for this task. So, Oderberg’s 
essentialism is of the a posteriori kind – and probably the best example of this approach 
combined with an Aristotelian ontology of essence. I will devote the rest of section 2.1 to a 
discussion of Oderberg’s account. 
 
2.1.1 Oderberg’s essentialism 
Oderberg insists that no direct empirical test could enable us to discover essences, even 
though essences are tracked by the empirical sciences – the account is fallibilist. It also seems 
clear that Oderberg holds essence to be epistemically prior to modality. In particular, it is 
important for Oderberg that the essence of an object is not merely a bundle of the essential 
properties of that object. His main reason for resisting this type of ‘bundle theory’ is what he 
calls ‘the unity problem’, namely, there should be something to hold a bundle of essential 
properties together in order to ensure that, say, the essential properties of a given kind are 
always featured in the members of that kind (Oderberg 2011: 90). The unity problem, 
sometimes also called ‘the problem of complex essences’ (Dumsday 2010), will turn out to be 
of great importance for the epistemology of essence. In fact, the problem goes back to the 
Aristotelian problem of propria. Here is a passage from Oderberg with a relevant example: 
 
 
Having a capacity for humour is an essential property [...] of human beings, and in this sense we 
can say it flows from the essence of human beings to have a capacity for humour. But the essence 
of being human is to be a rational animal, and humans have a capacity for humour only because 
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they are rational animals. (Oderberg 2007: 49.) 
 
This seems correct insofar as we need to distinguish between the essence of an entity and 
what that essence may entail (ignoring any problems with this particular example). But I do 
not regard the term ‘flow’ to be ideal. It is a historical notion, used by Locke, which Oderberg 
adopts into contemporary discussion for want of a better notion. Does the notion of flow 
simply suggest that the essential properties of an entity are logically entailed by the essence of 
that entity? If this is the case, then a distinction that Fine (1995b: 56–58) draws between 
constitutive and consequential essence may be relevant here: a property is a constitutive part 
of the essence of a given object if it is ‘directly definitive’ of the object, and merely 
consequential if it is had in virtue of being a logical consequence of some ‘more basic’ 
essential property of the object. However, the ‘basic’ essential properties of objects entail all 
sorts of things and not all of these seem like very plausible essential properties, e.g., the 
constitutive essential properties of humans entail any disjunction of an essential and a non-
essential property of humans, such as humans having a capacity for humour or flying.12 
Oderberg is determined to settle this problem, but not in terms of entailment. Rather, he gives 
a more rigorous definition of ‘flow’: a set of properties of the objects belonging to a given 
kind with a particular essence are caused by and originate in the form of that kind (Oderberg 
2011: 99–103). The idea is that form – a notion which is central to Aristotelian hylomorphic 
essentialism (which Oderberg is developing) – provides the essence and hence the properties 
that ‘flow’ from it. 
 As I understand it, then, ‘flow’ concerns the dependence between a set of essential 
properties and the essence which they are a part of. A concern regarding this solution is that it 
                                                 
12 See Gorman (2005), Koslicki (2012), and Correia (2011) for further discussion and some suggested solutions 
to the problems caused by the constitutive/consequential distinction. 
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seems impossible for us to distinguish, epistemically, between the essence itself and an 
essential property that ‘flows’ from the essence. For instance, if we are looking for the essence 
of water, we might be able to point out a number of properties that seem essential but fail to 
be so. One example might be the diffraction of water waves. Diffraction, the bending of 
waves around obstacles, is a feature of any wave, but it will of course only be apparent when 
we have a body of water rather than just one water molecule. So, is diffraction a property of 
the water molecule or something that merely flows from the essence of water? One might 
think that the solution to this problem – how to distinguish essential properties from mere 
propria, properties that flow from the essence – could be addressed in the same way that we 
can distinguish essential properties from merely accidental properties. Oderberg is aware of 
this type of challenge and attempts to address each of these issues.  
 Regarding the problem of genuine essential properties and mere accidents, Oderberg 
suggests that we can use our reason and common sense to determine when a given property is 
genuine in the sense that it is caused by and originates in the essence. Crucial for this process 
is to consider whether the thing in question, say, the kind ‘water’, would continue to display 
‘the characteristic properties, functions, operations and behaviour’ that it normally does even 
if a certain quality of it were to be removed (Oderberg 2007: 50–51). If this is the case, then 
the quality in question is not a part of the essence of the thing. But if removing the quality 
would cause ‘a general disturbance or radical change’ in the said functions of the thing, then it 
is a part of the thing’s essence (ibid.).13 However, on Oderberg’s position, it might seem that 
                                                 
13 It is not entirely clear what counts as a general disturbance of the type that Oderberg has in mind. One might 
suggest that, say, in the case of water, these disturbances would include changes in the microphysical 
behaviour of water molecules. Yet, Needham (2011) and Lowe (2011a) have argued that the macrophysical 
properties of water are more plausible defining characteristics. For discussion, see Tahko 2015a. This issues 
is of course crucial for the previous example, because diffraction is a macrophysical phenomenon. 
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we have only our imagination to rely on to determine whether a given change is of the first or 
the second type. These issues prompt Oderberg to recognize an epistemological caveat 
concerning essence. Essential properties, including the ones that ‘flow’ from the essence, are 
presumably open to empirical research (given sufficient technical resources etc.). But since 
essences are not mere bundles of essential properties, we need something that unifies these 
properties to get to the essence – this role is played by the Aristotelian notion of form. Here is 
where Oderberg as well needs a priori input, because he thinks that the existence of such a 
unifier can only be deduced by metaphysical a priori reasoning, even though determining 
what the unifier is will require empirical investigation. As Oderberg (2011: 97) puts it: ‘That 
gold must have a principle of unity is not within the remit of observation; that gold is a metal 
whose atomic constituents have atomic number 79 is’. This highlights the importance of the 
unity problem: a priori elements appear to be unavoidable in determining when a collection 
of essential properties constitutes an essence. 
 
2.1.2 A priori elements in a posteriori essentialism? 
The problem that seems to be emerging for the a posteriori route to essence is that we must 
already have grasped the essence we are looking for before we can identify the essential 
properties that ‘flow’ from it. It seems that our epistemic access to essence is often piecemeal: 
we wonder if a certain kind of entity, say, a certain subatomic particle, could possibly exist. 
We determine this by considering the essential properties that the particle would have, were it 
to exist: perhaps its mass etc. But, as we saw, it would appear that we can grasp an essence 
only after we have acquired sufficient knowledge about the essential properties associated 
with that essence. Or, to put it another way, we must have some prior conception of the 
essence of an object before we can recognize that it acts as a unifier for a given set of essential 
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properties. If we need something like this in any case, then perhaps an account which takes us 
to have a priori access to essence would be better off to begin with? 
 Oderberg’s reply to this type of concern is that all we need to know a priori – at least 
in the case of natural kinds as opposed to abstract mathematical objects – is that a given kind, 
say, a subatomic particle, has an essence, not what that essence is.14 Further, we can know 
that a given property (such as mass, perhaps), is a good candidate for an essential property of 
a given kind because of things like universality in the kind, the way it characterizes the kind, 
and the difficulty or impossibility of removing that property from random members of the 
kind. It seems to me that these are indeed all good ways to identify properties that might be a 
part of some essence or other, but this may not remove the core of the difficulty. To know 
which kind a given essential property is associated with, some prior knowledge about the 
essence of that kind seems to be necessary. Consider the Higgs boson, which was finally 
discovered in 2012. This discovery was highly anticipated and physicists had a very good idea 
about the mass range of the predicted Higgs as well as its role in the Standard Model of 
particle physics well in advance of the discovery. But how did physicists know that the 
observed mass of the Higgs boson, now confirmed to be in the range of 125.09 ± 0.24 GeV/c 
is truly part of the essence of the Higgs kind, rather than, say, an emergent feature of some yet 
to be discovered natural kind? If it had turned out that the data from the Large Hadron 
Collider is not attributable to the Higgs boson, but rather to some emergent feature of a further 
kind of thing, then could it not even have turned out that all the data was due to some merely 
accidental properties of this further kind of thing? 
 Perhaps all this is something that the a posteriori essentialist can address with the 
built-in fallibilism of the account, but a friend of the a priori approach can continue to push 
                                                 
14 Based on an e-mail exchange with Oderberg in 2011. 
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for the importance of the a priori task of unifying the essential properties, which already 
seems to presuppose an understanding of what kind of thing we are dealing with. If it is only 
possible to engage in an analysis about what characterizes a given kind after we have at least 
a partial understanding of what that kind is, that is, of the essence of the kind, then we ought 
to consider the possibility of acquiring this type of a priori knowledge about essences. Let us 
now see how that approach fares. 
 
2.2 A priori access to essence 
The obvious challenge faced by any account of the epistemology of essence postulating direct 
a priori access to essence is that the cognitive faculty that enables this epistemic access calls 
for an explanation. There may be a temptation to take this epistemic access to be primitive. I 
do not consider this to be a good strategy, but there are very few attempts in the literature to 
provide a better explanation. However, the shortcomings of traditional Kripke-Putnam 
essentialism have prompted some philosophers to move towards a priori essentialism despite 
the epistemic challenge. Perhaps a negative argument is the best argument we can have? 
Lowe often motivates his view via such negative arguments (e.g., 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2013), 
aimed towards the Kripke-Putnam type a posteriori essentialism of the likes of Alexander 
Bird.15 Lowe argues that since the Kripke-Putnam inference-pattern used to deduce 
knowledge of individual essences is suspect, perhaps all essential truths are a priori. But we 
ought to be able to say something positive as well. Note also that Lowe himself explicitly 
rules out conceivability and intuitions (e.g., Lowe 2014) as a potential a priori route to 
knowledge of essence. In what follows I will reconstruct Lowe’s a priori essentialism and 
                                                 
15 See also Bird 2008 and Lowe’s (2008b) reply to Bird. 
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propose some ways to develop it further. 
 
2.2.1 Lowe’s essentialism 
Lowe’s arguments for a priori essentialism rely on his more general metaphysical 
commitment according to which, in general, ‘essence precedes existence’ both ontologically 
and epistemologically. On the epistemic side, the idea is that we can – indeed we must – 
generally know the essence of a thing before we can know whether that thing exists. In other 
words, we have to know that it is possible for a thing of a particular kind to exist before we 
can determine whether a thing of that kind actually exists. One of Lowe’s best examples, in 
my view, is the case of transuranic elements: many of them were only synthesized after their 
possible existence was determined by non-empirical means. With the help of Mendeleev’s 
periodic table, chemists have been able to predict the existence of a number of yet to be 
discovered elements and to give highly accurate predictions of their properties. Later on they 
were able to synthesize these elements and verify that they indeed had the predicted 
properties. The idea that Lowe proposes is that this process would not have been possible 
without a prior grasp of the essences of transuranic elements. In fact, Lowe (2008a: 35) thinks 
that we cannot even ‘talk or think comprehendingly’ about things whose essences we do not 
know.  
 There is something appealing about this story, and I will develop on it below, but there 
are some aspects that require further elaboration first. Perhaps the most pressing of these is 
Lowe’s (2008a: 36) acknowledgement that we only need to know a part of a thing’s essence 
to be able to talk or think about it. As Bird (2007b) has pointed out, this appears to leave the 
possibility of a posteriori essentialism open, since it could be that we come to know most of a 
thing’s essence by a posteriori means even if we must know a part of it a priori. Indeed, it is 
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plausible that to be able to distinguish different kinds of things, and especially things like 
natural kinds, a considerable amount of empirical information is needed in addition to 
knowledge of general essentialist facts (such as chemical substances having their actual 
molecular composition essentially). This suggests that the Kripke-Putnam story about how we 
can derive knowledge of metaphysical necessities from general essentialist (a priori) facts 
with the help of particular empirical facts may have something going for it after all.  
 In various places, Lowe hints that essential dependence has a key role in our epistemic 
access to essences:16 
 
Consider the following thing, for instance: the set of planets whose orbits lie within that of Jupiter. 
What kind of thing is that? Well, of course, it is a set, and as such an abstract entity that depends 
essentially for its existence and identity on the things that are its members—namely, Mercury, 
Venus, Earth, and Mars. Part of what it is to be a set is to be something that depends in these ways 
upon certain other things—the things that are its members. Someone who did not grasp that fact 
would not understand what a set is. (Lowe 2008a: 37.) 
 
So, Lowe thinks that in many cases knowing how a thing is related to other things is central to 
our knowledge of what a thing is. Even in the case of sets though Lowe is careful to specify 
that depending essentially for its existence and identity on its members is only a part of what 
it is to be a set. In general, he seems to think that knowing the complete essence of a thing is 
not a very simple affair – perhaps almost impossible – but knowing a part of a thing’s essence 
is often sufficient for talking or thinking about it comprehendingly, and for being able to 
                                                 
16 See Tahko and Lowe 2015 for an analysis of different kinds of ontological dependence, including essential 
dependence. Lowe himself defines essential dependence as follows: ‘To say that X depends essentially on Y 
for its existence and identity is just to say that it is part of the essence of X that X exists only if Y exists and 




distinguish it from other things. Let me now briefly discuss the case of sets – Lowe’s account 
is at its strongest when it comes to the essences of abstract objects, so sets make for a good 
case study. We will get back to the case of concrete objects below, in section 2.2.3. 
 
2.2.2 Building on Lowe’s essentialism: the case of sets 
Let us look at sets more closely, as they provide a fairly simple yet illuminating example. On 
the face of it, it would appear that one can work with sets without knowing very much, if 
anything, about their essence. Since set theories, like ZFC, are extensional, we can derive a 
number of theorems without going beyond extensionality. Extensionality guarantees that two 
sets are equivalent if and only if they share all their members, although this does not mean 
that the sets were formed in the same manner. Moreover, working with sets on a purely 
extensional level would not seem to require a deeper comprehension of what the nature of sets 
is, in Lowe’s sense, so the idea that one must know the existence and identity conditions of 
sets before one can understand what a set is becomes less plausible. But we must be careful 
here, for it is one thing to prove set-theoretical theorems on a purely extensional level 
according to the rules of some formal system, and quite another to prove that these theorems 
express truths about sets. In order to establish truths about sets, we also need some 
independent reasons to think that the purely extensional system accurately models the 
behaviour of sets, and here it seems that some further insight into what constitutes a set may 
be required. Some such reasons may very well be available – plausibly this will involve the 
role of the axiom of extensionality in set theory. But once it is acknowledged that such 
reasons are needed to express truths about sets, it is once again possible to defend the idea that 
a previous grasp of the essence of sets may be needed before it is possible to express truths 
about sets (rather than about purely extensional formal systems). 
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 A possible way to defend this idea is to build on the classic iterative conception of set 
(Boolos 1971). For instance, Øystein Linnebo (2010) has suggested that the set-theoretical 
hierarchy and the quantifiers used in set theory should be interpreted in modal terms, that is, 
as having an implicit modal character.17 If this is correct, then it seems that the iterative 
conception of set cannot be purely extensional, as the implicit modal character must be 
explained somehow. Linnebo develops one approach towards understanding the modality 
involved, but we do not need to go into the details here; all that is needed for the purposes of 
this example is a plausible case for a need to go beyond extensionality. Thus, one line of 
thought that would support the need for prior understanding of sets goes roughly as follows.18 
Starting with the iterative conception of set we can determine a certain set-theoretical 
hierarchy, which has an implicit modal character. This conception captures the essence of sets, 
and it is only after one has this conception of set that one can recognize the theorems of ZFC, 
for instance, as expressing truths about sets, rather than just being elements of a purely 
extensional formal system. The most controversial part of this line of thought is perhaps the 
claim that the iterative conception captures the essence of sets. I will not attempt to support 
this claim here, but it is at least partly corroborated by the fact that many of the axioms of 
ZFC can be motivated by the iterative conception – this much is well documented in the 
literature (e.g., Boolos 1971, Parsons 1983, Yablo 2006, and Linnebo 2010).19 
                                                 
17 See also Parsons (1983) and Yablo (2006). 
18 I would like to thank Ramiro Caso for suggesting this type of line of thought to me. See also Fine (2005) for a 
relevant analysis of sets. 
19 In discussion (e-mail exchange in 2011) Oderberg has questioned the inference from our knowledge of the 
essence of sets to the belief that sets exist. I take it that in the case of abstract objects like sets, this inference 
is fairly straightforward: if it is part of the essence of a set that it has the very members that it has, then the 
existence of the set appears to be nothing over and above the existence of the members of that set. Of course, 
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2.2.3 Lowe’s essentialism and concrete objects 
The examples that we have considered so far have been fairly theoretical, such as transuranic 
elements and sets – the latter being of course abstract objects. But one objection that might be 
raised against Lowe’s idea that essence precedes existence stems from more familiar everyday 
objects.20 Consider cats for instance. If Lowe is right, then we would have to know (a part of) 
the essence of the kind ‘cat’ before we can talk or think about cats comprehendingly, or 
indeed to distinguish cats from other objects. Yet, it seems that we do not need to know very 
much at all about cats to be able to think about them, individuate them in thought, and refer to 
them quite comprehendingly.21 Perhaps we only need to know that they are living organisms. 
Even if one thinks that cats are robots or demons, it would still seem to be the case that when 
one sees a cat one is immediately capable of thinking about it (as a cat, albeit a robot-cat or a 
demon-cat), and successfully referring to it in conversation. While I think that there is much 
more to be said about the apparent difference between familiar everyday objects and abstract 
                                                                                                                                                        
the strategy for establishing the existence of a given object depends on what the essence of the object is, but I 
consider the case of sets to be among the easier cases. Things get much trickier with material, concrete 
objects. 
20 At this point it may be useful to note that our epistemic access to the essences of different kinds of objects, and 
perhaps abstract vs. concrete objects in particular, could plausibly differ even radically. In fact, this would 
suggest that we must resort to some sort of a hybrid view after all (i.e., combining a priori and a posteriori 
elements). On the face of it, it is difficult to see how a posteriori essentialism could account for the essences 
of abstract objects (although perhaps there is a way to do this), so unless we can explain our epistemic access 
to the essences of concrete objects in terms of a priori essentialism as well, then a hybrid view looks 
unavoidable. See Tahko (2017) for discussion; we will return to this in section 3. 
21 The problem at hand does not concern our ability to refer to objects though; as Lowe (2008a: fn. 24) notes, he 
is not interested in semantic questions in his theory, but rather about our acquaintance with ‘objects of 
thought.’ Accordingly, I will also omit any discussion of semantic matters here. 
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or theoretical objects, it may be that the apparent simplicity of thinking and talking about 
these familiar objects is exactly due to their being so familiar to us. That is, one might doubt 
that there is a genuine difference between familiar, concrete objects and more theoretical or 
abstract objects. The key here is how we interpret Lowe’s requirement for talking or thinking 
about an object comprehendingly. Lowe does not go into much detail about this requirement, 
but it appears to be doing a lot of work in his account; it is also a possible escape route from 
the objection under consideration, namely, that the familiarity of everyday objects is all that 
drives Lowe’s idea that essence precedes existence. Perhaps it is just the inherited human 
knowledge about cats and other familiar objects that is doing the work here?22 By adopting a 
fairly strong reading of ‘comprehendingly’, it could be argued that one does indeed need to 
know a number of things about the essence of the kind ‘cat’ before it is possible to think or 
talk about cats comprehendingly. 
 According to Lowe (2008a: fn. 23; see also Lowe 2013: Ch. 8), to be able to think or 
talk about cats comprehendingly, it may be sufficient to know that cats are animals or living 
organisms. This would at least rule out radical mistakes such as thinking that cats are robots. I 
take it that the underlying idea is as follows: someone who thinks that cats are robots or 
demons does not understand what it means to be a cat, that is, we would have to say that this 
person is not acquainted with cats (as an object of thought). Hence, such a person would not 
be able to pick out cats with any reliability, since they might for instance think that an actual 
robot is also a cat. A crucial element of ‘comprehension’ would thus appear to be a sufficient 
grasp of the identity and existence conditions of a given object. What constitutes a ‘sufficient’ 
grasp? We will get to this in a moment. In any case, there is always room for error, so the 
requirement should not be understood as the absence of any possibility to mistake one kind of 
                                                 
22 Thanks to David Oderberg for suggesting this line of thought. 
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thing for another kind of thing. An important specification of this idea concerns the 
relationship between general essences and categorial hierarchy – a thesis that Lowe calls 
‘categoricalism’ and which maintains that one necessary condition for a thinker’s ability to 
single out objects in thought is the thinker’s grasp of a categorial concept under which the 
thinker conceives the object to fall (Lowe 2013: 21). This grasp may be implicit. Lowe’s own 
example concerning Oscar, the cat, will help to illustrate the idea (Lowe 2013: 23ff.) (and we 
will get the answer to our question about a ‘sufficient’ grasp as well).  
 Let us suppose that the object of your singular thoughts is Oscar, the cat. You see 
Oscar and track his movements with your eyes. But suppose, for reductio, that you do not 
acknowledge categoricalism and hence do not conceive Oscar to fall under any categorial 
concept, such as being a cat. Now, following the idea that statues and lumps of matter 
coincide, Lowe suggests that Oscar as well must coincide with a certain hunk of matter. If 
that’s right, then you will have presumably seen and tracked the hunk of matter as well. If you 
were an anti-categoricalist, you would now have to explain why you would be able to have 
singular thoughts about Oscar, the cat, rather than the numerically distinct hunk of matter – 
which might indeed just as well be a robot, or a demon. Lowe of course insists that you 
cannot have genuine, de re singular thoughts about an object without at least an implicit grasp 
of the relevant categorial concept – a ‘sufficient’ grasp requires one to be able to place the 
entity in question under the relevant categorial concept. 
 The example concerning Oscar is still very crude, but Lowe does specify the case 
(2013: 27). Let us suppose that your neighbours talk about Oscar, saying that Oscar is white 
and beautiful, but never reveal that he is in fact a cat, rather than say, a vase (or a robot, or a 
demon…). As Lowe observes, according to the usual causal-historical theory of linguistic 
reference, you can refer to Oscar successfully. But Lowe protests that since Oscar could be 
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any kind of thing whatsoever, you have not really managed to express singular thoughts about 
Oscar: ‘thing’ and ‘object’ are transcategorial terms, whereas Lowe’s categoricalism requires 
that to have genuine singular thoughts about Oscar you would at least have to grasp that Oscar 
is a living being, an animal, because that would appear to be the narrowest categorial concept 
that Oscar could fall under. It might be sufficient for one to have singular thoughts about 
Oscar if one thinks that Oscar is a dog – another kind of living being – but not if one thinks 
that Oscar is an ornament of some kind. The details of such examples will of course partly 
depend on one’s view of the correct categorial hierarchy, but the picture that Lowe is 
developing seems clear enough: to be able to think or talk about something comprehendingly, 
we must have grasped, at least implicitly, some subset of the relevant thing’s criteria of 
identity. So it seems that a natural reading of Lowe’s view is to take it that grasping the 
identity and existence conditions of an object just is grasping the essence of an object. This 
may put some fairly strong constraints on our ability to have de re singular thoughts 
concerning objects, but this is not the place to discuss that problem. 
 We now have a rough idea about Lowe’s epistemology of essence, but some questions 
remain. In particular, it still seems that there must be something more to essence than just the 
bundle of the relevant identity and existence conditions, for how are we supposed to know, a 
priori, which object a given set of such conditions is associated with? Here we once again 
face the unity problem. As we saw in section 2.1.1, Oderberg introduces the idea of a unifying 
a priori principle in order to establish this link, but I expressed some doubts about this move. 
If each object is associated with a unique unifying principle, then the unifying principle itself 
is starting to look very much like the essence (if not a haecceity), and it is not clear that this 
will help us to address the original epistemic problem. For Oderberg, it is the Aristotelian 
notion of form that goes towards addressing this problem, but Lowe himself does not adopt 
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Aristotelian hylomorphism or the form/matter distinction as it is usually applied in this 
tradition (see Lowe 1998). 
 One further worry that might be raised at this point concerns children’s ability to talk 
about and reliably pick out, say, animals, without any deeper comprehension about the general 
essence of animals. Might children be able to having singular thoughts about animals without 
even knowing that animals are living organisms? I think that Lowe would answer negatively. 
As a first attempt to settle the matter, we could subject a group of young children to a test to 
determine whether they have grasped the essence of cats to a sufficient degree to talk and 
think about them comprehendingly. If they are able to pick out the cat from a sample space 
including a cat, a cat-like robot, and a dog, then they have at least a partial grasp of the 
essence of cats. However, this would surely beg the question, for what guarantees that it is 
grasping the essence that is doing the work here?23 Lowe’s requirements for grasping (a part 
of) an essence, it seems to me, are fairly modest. Everyone, even quite young children, is 
supposedly able to grasp partial essences. But something more needs to be said in support of 
the account to address the concerns raised above. I venture to suggest that the most promising 
reply available to Lowe is to introduce context as a variable in cases of ‘comprehension’. In a 
situation where cats are the only animals about, it is sufficient to know that cats are animals to 
be able to think and talk about them comprehendingly, and to distinguish them from other 
objects. However, if there are other animals about, then more detailed information about the 
essence of cats would be required, such as cats being feline. Similarly, we would need to 
know even more about cats to distinguish them from other felines. Eventually, we might 
encounter difficult situations where we may not know enough about the essences (and so the 
relevant criteria of identity) of a combination of objects to adequately distinguish them, and 
                                                 
23 For relevant discussion, see also Vaidya 2010 and Horvath 2014. 
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‘species’ may very well be one such problematic case. 
 Perhaps one final example would be useful. Consider the classic case of a bronze 
statue and the lump of bronze that it is composed of. If the lump and the statue are indeed two 
different things, as Lowe (2008a: 46) thinks they are, then no amount of empirical 
information will help us to determine this. Empirically, the statue and the lump are 
indistinguishable. It is only because we know what kind of things bronze statues and lumps of 
bronze are – and specifically knowing what they essentially depend on for their existence and 
identity – that we can distinguish them. Here it may be helpful to recall Oderberg’s idea that if 
a removal of a certain quality that a thing has would produce a radical change in the 
properties, functions etc. of that thing, then we are most likely dealing with a quality that is 
part of the thing’s essence. We can for instance consider a change in the shape of the bronze 
statue and the lump of bronze: the lump could survive such a change without any radical 
consequences for its key properties and functions, whereas the statue could not, and hence the 
shape of a bronze statue is plausibly a part of its essence. In passing, Lowe seems to make 
reference to this type of idea, since he notes that we might be able to grasp the identity and 
existence conditions of entities with the help of their causal powers (Lowe 2013: 115). 
Accordingly, Lowe would likely attempt a strategy not unlike Oderberg’s in order to address 
the unity problem: we can determine whether an object continues to exist by observing 
whether its distinctive causal powers (which are grounded in its essential properties) continue 
to be manifested. But as we will see in the next section, this move may not be available for a 
pure a priori essentialist. 
 While this brief reconstruction of Lowe’s a priori essentialism leaves many questions 
open, I hope to have given a fair summary of the core ideas and some of the problems 
concerning the account. I will now conclude by outlining some reasons to consider a hybrid 
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approach to the epistemology of essence. 
 
 
3. A Hybrid Approach? 
One key problem for a unitary account of the epistemology of essence concerns the 
distinction between concrete and abstract objects. We discussed the prospects of Lowe’s a 
priori essentialism regarding concrete objects and found some problems, although I think that 
Lowe’s a priori essentialism is very plausible in the case of abstract objects, such as 
geometrical objects (see Lowe 2012 for a discussion of geometrical objects). As I have argued 
elsewhere (Tahko 2017), it is much more difficult to adapt Lowe’s account for the general 
essences of natural kinds. I will not dwell on this issue here, but will instead focus on a 
passage from Lowe himself which, appropriately interpreted, may take us toward a hybrid 
view, despite the fact that he is typically quite explicitly in favour of a priori essentialism. 
The passage I have in mind is the following (similar passages can be found elsewhere, 
e.g., Lowe 2014: 257): 
 
The growth of objective knowledge consists […] in a constant interplay between 
an a priori element – knowledge of essence – and an a posteriori element, the 
empirical testing of existential hypotheses whose possibility has already been 
anticipated a priori. (Lowe 2013: 156). 
 
Lowe adds that this interplay does not have a foundational ‘starting point’ and it’s clear that 
he wants the process to be a fallibilist one. He also makes it clear that the empirical element in 
the process is not merely perceptual evidence, but rather ‘empirical evidence’ as it is 
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understood in scientific practice. But it looks as if knowledge of essence is supposed to be 
contained entirely in the a priori element. The context of this passage is Lowe’s criticism of 
conceptualism, i.e., the view that essentialist knowledge concerns concepts. The idea is that 
we can at least sometimes know a priori what it is to be an object of a certain kind even if no 
objects of that kind actually exist. Empirical evidence enters the picture when we want to 
determine whether any objects of that kind do in fact exist. As an example, recall the case of 
transuranic elements discussed in section 2.2.1. 
 There’s much that I find appealing in Lowe’s account, but I think that the mentioned 
interplay between the a priori element and the a posteriori element is more subtle than Lowe 
leads us to believe. In particular, I’m not fully convinced that we can, properly speaking, 
know what it is to be an object of a certain kind entirely a priori (see Tahko 2015a) – and this 
would suggest that knowledge of essence is the result of this interplay rather than present only 
in the a priori element. In fact, I think that there is a slight tension in Lowe’s own account in 
this regard, for recall what was said above about the role of causal powers in this process: it 
seems that in order to address the unity problem, Lowe has to resort to a strategy familiar 
from Oderberg, namely, to insist that we can determine the identity and existence conditions 
of objects (at least partly), by observing whether the object’s distinctive causal powers (which 
are grounded in its essential properties) continue to be manifested (Lowe 2013: 115). Now, it 
should be plain to see that if we must refer to the causal powers of objects in order to gain 
epistemic access to their essential properties (in which these causal powers are grounded), 
then we must at least sometimes rely on empirical evidence to accurately determine what it is 
to be an object of a certain kind. We may, of course, rely on previous empirical information 
when we speculate what kind of causal powers objects of a certain kind (such as some yet to 
be synthesized transuranic elements) might have, but how could we know that these causal 
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powers arise from the essential properties of the very object that we had in mind? Only by 
rigorous empirical testing, it seems to me: we may have in mind several candidate objects that 
have very similar causal powers, but empirical testing will help us to single out which of these 
candidate objects we are in fact dealing with. This is how we can determine the existence and 
identity conditions of that object more accurately. Note that there is still room for an a priori 
element here, for in order to get this process started (even if there is no foundational ‘starting 
point’, as Lowe claims), we must indeed have at least some a priori knowledge about what 
kinds of objects are metaphysically possible. This is especially striking in the case of 
transuranic elements, since many of them can only be created by our particle accelerators or 
by supernovae, but we have nevertheless been able to determine many of their essential 
properties prior to empirical evidence. For Lowe, this is a crucial aspect of the relationship 
between metaphysics and natural science.24 
 To conclude, it seems that Lowe has given us an intriguing picture of the role of a 
priori knowledge in the epistemology of essence, but this picture does need to be completed 
with the help of empirical elements. If this is right, then it would be a mistake to describe 
Lowe’s account as purely rationalist, even in the sense that we first grasp the essences of 
possible entities a priori and then proceed to determine which ones of them actually exist 
with the help of empirical evidence. Instead, we can see that Lowe’s account assumes a subtle 
interplay of a priori and a posteriori elements, which may, properly interpreted, come close to 
a type of hybrid view about the epistemology of essence.25 
 
                                                 
24 For more details about this aspect of Lowe’s work, see Lowe 2011b. For discussion, see Morganti and Tahko 
forthcoming. 
25 I’d like to thank Ramiro Caro, Jonah Goldwater, Kathrin Koslicki, Laurie Paul, and David Oderberg for 
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